The situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Assistance Mission in the Transition in the Sudan – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/667) [EN/AR] – Sudan

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I. Introduction

1. This report is submitted pursuant to a Security Council resolution 2636 (2022), in which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Transitional Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) until 3 June 2023 and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report every 90 days on its implementation. The report covers developments in Sudan from 6 May to 20 August 2022 and includes an update on the implementation of the Mission’s mandate, incorporating gender considerations in all aspects as a cross-cutting issue.

II. Important Developments

A. Political situation

2 – The political crisis in Sudan remained unresolved, despite continued local, regional and international efforts aimed at facilitating a political solution to restore a credible, civilian-led democratic transition following the military coup of 25 October 2021. The lack of a political agreement and the absence of a functioning government contributed Full capacity in the insecurity in different parts of the country, as well as in the deteriorating economic and humanitarian situation.

3. The resistance committees in Khartoum and throughout Sudan intensified their protests to denounce the coup and to demand the return of civilian rule. Women participated in large numbers and organized and led demonstrations in various regions. Sudanese authorities often closed major roads and bridges ahead of demonstrations, particularly in Khartoum. Although most of the protests were peaceful and unarmed, the security forces constantly used live ammunition, tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets and sound bombs to disperse protesters in Khartoum state, killing 21 civilians and wounding 2,073 others, while the demonstrators caused 63 injuries. . He was hit by the security forces cars.

4. The largest nationwide protests took place on 30 June, commemorating the 1989 military coup that brought General Omar al-Bashir to power and overthrew the previous democratically elected government. It also witnessed the first march of “one million people” following the violent dispersal of protesters on 3 June 2019. Despite international and regional calls for restraint and public guarantees by the police that they would use non-lethal means to control crowds, the use of force by security forces to disperse the demonstration It killed nine protesters and wounded more than 600. The Sudanese police force stated that 96 policemen and 129 soldiers were wounded. The United Nations was unable to verify this information. The June 30 violence was strongly condemned by the international community, including the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). National actors, including women’s groups, have called for the protests to continue. Several sit-ins were held in Khartoum following 30 June to denounce the violence and use of force by the security forces.

5- The tripartite mechanism, made up of the United Nations, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), called for the creation of favorable conditions to enable negotiations between military and civilians. The Mechanism, in a public statement dated May 25, as well as in private meetings, called on the authorities to stop all forms of violence, release all detainees, stop all arrests, and lift the state of emergency. It continued to express concern about the excessive use of force by security forces, and called for credible investigations to be conducted into all incidents of violence. On May 29, the head of the Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, issued a decision to lift the nationwide state of emergency that had been in place since October 2021. A total of 171 detainees were released across the country.

6. On 8 June, the Tripartite Mechanism held a technical meeting in Khartoum to discuss the preparatory details of the civil-military dialogue with the aim of restoring a civilian-led democratic transition. The meeting was attended by a group of political parties and movements, the Sudanese Revolutionary Front and representatives of the army. Some critical political actors refused to join the meeting, including the Central Council of the Forces for Freedom and Change, the National Umma Party, the Sudanese Communist Party, the Women’s Rights Group, the Sudanese Professionals Association, and the Resistance Committees.

7- On 9 June, a meeting was held between the Central Council of the Forces of Freedom and Change and military representatives at the joint invitation of the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs of the United States of America and the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Sudan. The tripartite mechanism welcomed the meeting, during which direct talks were launched between representatives of the army and the forces of freedom and change. However, in the wake of the June 30 violence, the Central Council withdrew from the talks and called for continued civil disobedience and an escalation of protests.

8. On 2 July, the military component informed the tripartite mechanism of its intention to withdraw from the civil-military dialogue facilitated by the mechanism. Instead, it requested that the Mechanism facilitate civil-civil dialogue as an immediate priority to help reach consensus. On July 4, Lieutenant General Al-Burhan announced in a televised speech that the army would not participate in the negotiations facilitated by the mechanism in order to “make room for the political and revolutionary forces to… form a government of national competencies.” He added that after the formation of the government, the Sovereignty Council will be dissolved and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces formed, consisting of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. He noted that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces will be responsible for security and defense tasks and “related responsibilities” in agreement with the government.

9. Following the army’s withdrawal from the dialogue, the tripartite mechanism announced that the basis for continuing the civil-military talks on 8 June no longer existed, and that it would continue to work separately with all components to facilitate a political solution. In the meantime, various initiatives have been proposed by civil society figures and political forces to unify the positions of civilians. On July 23, the Vice-President of the Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant-General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, expressed his support for the army’s withdrawal from politics and urged “revolutionary and national political forces” to “accelerate reaching urgent solutions that lead to the formation of transitional governance institutions.” Then, in a televised interview on August 1, he acknowledged the “failure” of the October 25, 2021 coup, noting the deteriorating economic and security situation, and stressed the importance of security sector reform and the creation of a unified professional army.

10 – On 10 July, Lieutenant-General Al-Burhan appointed five retirees from the army, intelligence and police as ambassadors at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Central Council of the Forces for Freedom and Change immediately issued a statement condemning the appointments, noting that “these decisions reveal the true intentions [of the military] to control all aspects of life, and to militarize civilian functions, including foreign relations.”

11. Little progress has been made in implementing the Juba Peace Agreement in the Sudan. However, according to the course of the agreement in Darfur, the first batch of 2,000 members of the armed movement graduated on July 3 after several months of training. The force will be deployed in hot spots in North, West and South Darfur.

13. Meanwhile, on 11 June, 45 representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement from North, South and West Kordofan states announced that they had left the armed group, citing their dissatisfaction with the leadership’s indifference to Kordofan issues, and in particular the lack of – inclusion of ex-combatants in the security arrangements Agreed upon under the Juba Peace Agreement. They stated that they would form a political group to achieve the interests of Kordofan. In the Blue Nile region, on July 4, a number of elements of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Malik Agar faction, stationed in Ulu district of Bau locality, arrived in Damazin to receive training accordingly. with the Juba Peace Agreement.

14. The reporting period witnessed an escalation of tensions between the Sudan and Ethiopia in the disputed Fashqah border region. On June 26, the Sudanese Armed Forces accused the Ethiopian army of executing seven captured Sudanese soldiers and one civilian and displaying their bodies in public. On the same day, Sudan recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia and the Ethiopian ambassador to Sudan. On 27 and 28 June, Sudan and Ethiopia, respectively, sent letters to the President of the Security Council. On July 5, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia and General Al-Burhan met on the sidelines of the IGAD Summit in Kenya and agreed to defuse the tensions in Fashiqa.

12. On 11 August, the Wali of the Darfur region signed the Native Administration Bill into law, the first law to govern the Native Administration system in the Darfur region in line with the Juba Peace Agreement. However, concerns have been raised regarding the drafting process, its consistency with federal laws, and the jurisdiction of the regional government to issue the law.

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